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Abstract
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable
strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin is necessary under the
solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive, i.e. in distinct states
it selects distinct outcomes, we show that strict Maskin monotonicity is also sufﬁcient under a mild “no
worst alternative” condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We discuss how our results
extend when the social choice function is not responsive.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in
rationalizable strategies. We say that a social choice function f is rationalizably implemented if
there exists a mechanism such that every rationalizable strategy proﬁle leads to the realization of
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thesocialchoicefunction f.Apriori,implementationinrationalizablestrategiesdoesnotrequire
the existence of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium that leads to the realization of f, and hence
this implementation notion is neither stronger nor weaker than that of Nash implementation.
However, we establish that a strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition
shown by Maskin [1] to be necessary for Nash implementation is necessary under the more
stringent solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive
(i.e.,itneverpicksthesameoutcomeintwodistinctstates),weshowthatitisalsosufﬁcientunder
a “no worst alternative” (NWA) condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.
We are able to obtain this strong result because – like much of the classical implementation
literature – we allow inﬁnite mechanisms (including “integer games”); and – unlike the classical
implementation literature – we allow for stochastic mechanisms.
In earlier works (see [2,3]), two of us established necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
“robust implementation” in incomplete information environments. There we showed that a so-
cial choice function f can be Bayesian equilibrium implemented for all possible beliefs and
higher order beliefs if and only if f is implementable under an incomplete information ver-
sion of rationalizability. The results here are obtained by reﬁning and further developing the
rationalizability arguments for the complete information environment. We can establish stronger
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions than in the incomplete information environment. We can also
dispense with an economic condition on the environment. In turn, we establish necessary condi-
tions and sufﬁcient conditions almost equivalent to Nash equilibrium implementation when the
socialchoicefunctionisresponsive.Theaugmentedmechanismwhichestablishesthesufﬁciency
result permits each agent to propose a menu of allocations. This construction already appeared
in Maskin [1] and Maskin and Sjöström [4] to establish complete information implementation
in the presence of mixed strategies. The sufﬁciency arguments for Nash equilibrium implemen-
tation typically rely on a no-veto property of the social choice function. In contrast, we use a
weak condition, introduced as “no worst alternative” by Cabrales and Serrano [5], to establish
the sufﬁciency argument. This condition requires that in state θ and for every agent i, the social
choice f(θ)is not the worst alternative among all possible allocations. The no worst alternative
property plays a role in our proof that is quite distinct from the no veto property in the classic
Nash equilibrium results. The no worst alternative property guarantees that in the augmented
mechanism, any report in state θ in which an agent expresses his disagreement with the remain-
ing agents cannot be a rationalizable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed that
if an agent were to express his disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would
only be possible in equilibrium if it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed
by f(θ).
These results narrow an open question in the literature. The existing literature shows that
Maskin monotonicity is necessary for Nash implementation in any mechanism (even if stochas-
tic mechanisms are allowed1). Abreu and Matsushima [6] shows that if implementation is made
easier by (i) requiring only virtual implementation; and (ii) imposing a weak domain restriction
ruling out identical preferences; then implementation is always possible even if it is made harder
by (iii) requiring ﬁnite mechanisms; and (iv) requiring the stronger solution concept of ratio-
nalizability. In addition, Abreu and Matsushima [7] extend their earlier argument from virtual
to exact implementation, but now using the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies
1 In such a case, Maskin monotonicity (that is usually deﬁned on the set of pure allocations) has to be stated on the set
of lotteries on pure allocations.Author's personal copy
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rather than strictly dominated strategies.2 Our result shows that it is possible to exactly imple-
ment a social choice function, in rationalizable strategies, even if domain restriction (ii) fails,
as long as inﬁnite, stochastic, mechanisms are allowed.
2. Setup
The environment consists of a collection of I agents (we write I for the set of agents); a ﬁnite
set of possible states Θ; a countable set of pure allocations Z (we write Y ≡  (Z) for the set of
lotteries on Z); and, to each state, we associate for each player i a von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function ui : Z ×Θ → R, extended to lotteries as ui : Y ×Θ → R with
ui(y,θ) =
 
z∈Z
yzui(z,θ).
We sometimes abuse notations and identify an outcome z in Z with the element of Y that assigns
probability one to the corresponding coordinate.
Thus at two distinct states θ and θ , all agents can have the same ordinal preferences; this
contrasts with some of the literature that associates a state with a proﬁle of ordinal preferences
(e.g. Maskin [1]). We discuss alternative formulations in the ﬁnal section. A mechanism M is
given by M = ((Mi)I
i=1,g), where each Mi is countable, M = M1 ×···×MI and g : M → Y.
The environment and the mechanism together describe a game of complete information for
each θ ∈ Θ. We will use (correlated) rationalizability as a solution concept.3 Our formal deﬁni-
tion will coincide with the standard deﬁnition with ﬁnite or compact message spaces. But we will
also allow inﬁnite, non-compact, message spaces; in this case, our deﬁnition is equivalent to one
introduced in Lipman [12]. Let a message set proﬁle S = (S1,...,SI), where each Si ∈ 2Mi, and
we write S for the collection of message set proﬁles. The collection S is a lattice with the natural
ordering of set inclusion: S  S  if Si ⊆ S 
i for all i. The largest element is S = (M1,...,MI).
The smallest element is S = (∅,∅,...,∅).
We deﬁne an operator bθ : S → S to iteratively eliminate never best responses with bθ =
(bθ
1,...bθ
i ,...,bθ
I) and bθ
i is deﬁned by
bθ
i (S) =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
mi ∈ Mi
 
       
there exists λi ∈  (M−i) such that
(1) λi(m−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ Sj for each j  = i,
(2) mi ∈ argmaxm 
i∈Mi
 
m−i∈M−i λi(m−i)ui(g(m 
i,m−i),θ),
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
.
We observe that bθ is increasing by deﬁnition: i.e., S  S  ⇒ bθ(S)  bθ(S ).B yT a r s k i ’ sﬁ x e d
point theorem, there is a largest ﬁxed point of bθ, which we label SM,θ. Thus (i) bθ(SM,θ) =
SM,θ and (ii) bθ(S) = S ⇒ S  SM,θ.I fmi ∈ SM,θ
i , we say that message mi is rationalizable
in (the complete information game parameterized by) state θ.
2 Abreu and Matsushima [7] actuallynote that their permissive implementation result holds under one round of removal
of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies. Hence, our result (that a
stronger version of Maskin monotonicity is necessary for rationalizable implementation) underlines a well-known fact
that replacing removal of weakly dominated strategies by removal of strictly dominated strategies can yield very different
results.
3 The original deﬁnition of rationalizability of Bernheim [8] and Pearce [9] required agents’ conjectures over their op-
ponents’ play to be independent. We follow the convention of some of the recent literature (e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein
[10]) in using “rationalizability” for the correlated version of rationalizability (see Brandenburger and Dekel [11] for an
early deﬁnition and discussion). Our results do not rely on the use of the correlated version of rationalizability.Author's personal copy
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We can also construct the ﬁxed point SM,θ by starting with S – the largest element of the
lattice – and iteratively applying the operator bθ. If the message sets are ﬁnite, we have
SM,θ
i 
 
n0
bθ
i
  
bθ n(S)
 
.
In this case, the solution concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
(see Brandenburger and Dekel [11]). But if the mechanism M is inﬁnite, transﬁnite induction
may be necessary to reach the ﬁxed point.4 We will also sometimes use the following notation
SM,θ
i,k  bθ
i
  
bθ k−1(S)
 
,
again using transﬁnite induction if necessary. Thus SM,θ
i is the set of messages surviving (trans-
ﬁnite) iterated deletion of never best responses. It is possible to show formally that SM,θ
i is the
set of messages that agent i might send consistent with common certainty of rationality and the
fact that payoffs are given by θ (see Lipman [12]). Finally, we will say that a message set proﬁle
S = (S1,...,SI) has the best-response property in state θ if S ⊆ bθ(S), or equivalently, if for
each player i and message mi ∈ Si, there exists λi ∈  (M−i) such that λi(m−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ Sj
for each j  = i, and
mi ∈ argmax
m 
i∈Mi
 
m−i∈M−i
λi(m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ
 
.
It is easy to check that if S has the best-response property in state θ, then S ⊆ SM,θ.
Now a social choice function (SCF) f is given by f : Θ → Y. Mechanism M implements f
in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that, for all θ, SM,θ  = ∅ and m ∈ SM,θ ⇒
g(m) = f(θ).S C Ff is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that
M implements f in rationalizable strategies. The deﬁnition of rationalizable implementation
does not require the existence of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium that leads the realization of
the social choice function f. Hence, a priori, rationalizable implementation need not be stronger
(neither weaker) than Nash implementation. However, in the next section, we provide necessary
conditions and sufﬁcient conditions for rationalizable implementation almost equivalent to Nash
implementation.
3. Main result
We ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity restricted to social choice functions:
Deﬁnition 1 (Maskin monotonicity). Social choice function f satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity if:
1. f(θ)= f(θ ) whenever
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
 ui(y,θ) ⇒ ui
 
f(θ),θ  
 ui
 
y,θ  
for all i and y;
or, equivalently,
4 Lipman [12] contains a formal description of the transﬁnite induction required. As he notes “we remove strategies
which are never a best reply, taking limits where needed”.Author's personal copy
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2. f(θ) = f(θ ) implies
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
 ui(y,θ) and ui
 
y,θ  
>u i
 
f(θ),θ  
for some i and y.
The latter condition states that in case the desired alternative differs at state θ and θ , there
must exist at least one agent who, if the true state were θ  and she expected other agents to
claim the state is θ, could be offered a reward y that would give her a strict incentive to “report”
the deviation of other agents, where the reward y would not tempt her if the true state was in
fact θ i.e. she would have a (weak) incentive to “report truthfully”. The strengthening of Maskin
monotonicity we will use, reinforces the latter statement, requiring that the reward y gives a strict
incentive to “report truthfully” if the true state were θ.
Deﬁnition 2 (Strict Maskin monotonicity). Social choice function f satisﬁes strict Maskin mono-
tonicity if:
1. f(θ)= f(θ ) whenever
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>u i(y,θ) ⇒ ui
 
f(θ),θ  
 ui
 
y,θ  
for all i and y; (1)
or, equivalently,
2. f(θ) = f(θ ) implies
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>u i(y,θ) and ui
 
y,θ  
>u i
 
f(θ),θ  
for some i and y. (2)
Maskin monotonicity, which is necessary for Nash implementation, is weaker than strict
Maskin monotonicity. We show in the following proposition that strict Maskin monotonicity
(and hence Maskin monotonicity) is necessary for rationalizable implementation.
Proposition 1 (Necessary conditions). If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f
satisﬁes strict Maskin monotonicity.
Proposition 1 is a consequence of the following lemma. In words, it states that, given a social
choice function f,i fθ and θ  satisfy condition (1) in the deﬁnition of strict Maskin monotonicity
and, in addition, f is implementable by a mechanism M, then the set of rationalizable message
proﬁles must be the same in state θ and θ .
Lemma 1. Pick θ and θ  satisfying condition (1). If mechanism M = ((Mi)I
i=1,g)implements
f in rationalizable strategies, then we have SM,θ = SM,θ 
.
Proof. Pick θ and θ  satisfying condition (1) and ﬁx any mechanism M = ((Mi)I
i=1,g) that
implements f in rationalizable strategies.
We ﬁrst show that SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
. Because bθ(SM,θ) = SM,θ, SM,θ has the best-response
property in state θ (i.e., for each player i and all mi ∈ SM,θ
i , there exists λ
mi,θ
i ∈  (M−i) such
that λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM,θ
j for each j  = i), and
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 

 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ
 
(3)Author's personal copy
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for all m 
i ∈ Mi. We want to show that mi is also a best response against λ
mi,θ
i in state θ . Since
i and mi ∈ SM,θ
i have been ﬁxed arbitrarily, this will prove that SM,θ has the best-response
property in state θ  and so that SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
as claimed. Note ﬁrst that for any m−i such that
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0,m −i ∈ SM,θ
−i and so because mi ∈ SM,θ
i ,w eh a v eg(mi,m−i) = f(θ). Thus,
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ  
= ui
 
f(θ),θ  
=
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ  
(4)
for all m 
i ∈ SM,θ
i . In addition, we claim that
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 
= ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ
 
for any m 
i / ∈ SM,θ
i . By (3), the above is true with a weak inequality. Now if an equality were to
hold, some m 
i / ∈ SM,θ
i would be a best response against λ
mi,θ
i in state θ and so ({m 
i}∪SM,θ
i )×
SM,θ
−i would have the best-response property in state θ implying that m 
i ∈ SM,θ
i which is false
by assumption. Now we know that
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>u i(y,θ) ⇒ ui
 
f(θ),θ  
 ui
 
y,θ  
for all i and y,
and so applying this to the lotteries y 
 
m−i λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)g(m 
i,m−i), we get that
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ  
= ui
 
f(θ),θ  

 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ  
(5)
for any m 
i / ∈ SM,θ
i . Finally, (4) and (5) ensure that mi is also a best response against λ
mi,θ
i in
state θ .
Now, let us show that SM,θ ⊇ SM,θ 
. Since f is implementable in rationalizable strategies
by M and SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
,w eh a v ef(θ)= f(θ ). Take any player i and any m∗
i ∈ SM,θ 
i we
show that m∗
i ∈ SM,θ
i .P i c ka n ymi ∈ SM,θ
i and λ
mi,θ
i ∈  (M−i) satisfying λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0 ⇒
mj ∈ SM,θ
j for all j  = i, and
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
=
 
m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 

 
m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ
 
(6)
for any m 
i ∈ Mi. Note that since SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
, we have that λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM,θ 
j
for all j  = i; in addition, m∗
i ∈ SM,θ 
i and so g(m∗
i ,m−i) = f(θ ) = f(θ)for any m−i such that
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0. HenceAuthor's personal copy
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m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m∗
i ,m−i
 
,θ
 
= ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
=
 
m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 
, (7)
and thus (6) and (7) together show that m∗
i is a best response against λ
mi,θ
i in state θ which proves
that m∗
i ∈ SM,θ
i , as claimed. 
It is clear that Proposition 1 is obtained as a corollary of Lemma 1.
Oury and Tercieux [13] have shown that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for
“continuous” partial implementation of a social choice function, where “continuous” means that
the direct mechanism itself must work for types that are close to the complete information types
in the product topology. They also show that full implementation in rationalizable strategies is
necessary. Hence, an alternative way to prove the necessity of Maskin monotonicity would be to
use this latter result and Proposition 1.
We need two extra conditions for the sufﬁciency result.
Deﬁnition 3 (Responsive social choice function). Social choice function f is responsive if θ  =
θ  ⇒ f(θ) = f(θ ).
The notion of responsiveness requires that the social choice function “responds” to a change
in the state with a change in the social allocation.
Deﬁnition 4 (No worst alternative). Social choice function f satisﬁes “no worst alternative”
(NWA) if, for each i and θ, there exists yi(θ) such that
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>u i
 
yi(θ),θ
 
. (8)
Property NWA requires that an agent never gets his worst outcome under the social choice
function. The NWA property appears in Cabrales and Serrano [5] as a sufﬁcient condition to
guarantee implementation in best-response dynamics. Given the set of allocations {yi(θ)}θ∈Θ,
we deﬁne the average allocation yi of this set by setting
yi 
1
#Θ
 
θ∈Θ
yi(θ). (9)
Note that under NWA, for all θ and all i, there exists yi(θ) such that
ui
 
yi(θ),θ
 
>u i(yi,θ); (10)
this can be established by deﬁning yi(θ) as follows:
yi(θ) 
1
#Θ
 
  θ =θ
yi(  θ)+
1
#Θ
f(θ).
We also deﬁne the average allocation y of the set {yi}i∈I by setting
y 
1
I
 
i∈I
yi.Author's personal copy
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Here again, we note that under NWA, for all θ and all i, there exists y∗
i (θ) such that
ui
 
y∗
i (θ),θ
 
>u i(y,θ), (11)
where the above inequality clearly holds after deﬁning y∗
i (θ) as follows:
y∗
i (θ) 
1
I
 
j =i
yj +
1
I
yi(θ).
We now construct an auxiliary set of allocations, denoted by {zi(θ,θ )}θ,θ , which uses the ex-
istence of the allocations {yi(θ)}θ∈Θ. The allocations {zi(θ,θ )}θ,θ  are going to appear in the
canonical mechanism to be deﬁned shortly where they guarantee the existence of better response
for agent i should the remaining agents choose to misreport the true state. In particular, the fol-
lowing lemma establishes that for agent i the allocation zi(θ,θ ) represents an improvement if
the true state is θ but the other agents misreport it to be θ . It also establishes that zi(θ,θ ) would
not constitute an improvement relative to f(θ ) if the true state were indeed θ .
Lemma 2. If social choice function f satisﬁes “no worst alternative”( NWA) then for each
player i, there exists a collection of lotteries {zi(θ,θ )}θ,θ  such that for all θ,θ :
ui
 
f
 
θ  
,θ  
>u i
 
zi
 
θ,θ  
,θ  
, (12)
and for θ  = θ :
ui
 
zi
 
θ,θ  
,θ
 
>u i
 
zi
 
θ ,θ  
,θ
 
. (13)
Proof. Based on the allocations {yi(θ)}θ∈Θ from Deﬁnition 4, we deﬁne our collection of lot-
teries as follows. First, for all θ :
zi
 
θ ,θ  
 (1−ε)yi
 
θ  
+εyi,
with yi as deﬁned in (9), and for all θ,θ  with θ  = θ :
zi
 
θ,θ  
 (1−ε)yi
 
θ  
+
ε
#Θ
  
  θ =θ
yi(  θ)+f(θ)
 
.
By NWA and the ﬁniteness of the state space Θ, we can ﬁnd a sufﬁciently small, but positive,
ε>0 suchthatforall θ and θ : ui(f(θ ),θ )>u i(zi(θ,θ ),θ ) whichestablishesinequality(12).
Now we observe that the only difference between zi(θ ,θ ) and zi(θ,θ ) is the fact that the lottery
yi(θ) is replaced by the lottery f(θ). But now by NWA, this is clearly increasing the expected
utility of agent i in state θ, and hence we have for all θ,θ  with θ  = θ :
ui
 
zi
 
θ,θ  
,θ
 
>u i
 
zi
 
θ ,θ  
,θ
 
,
which establishes the strict inequality (13). 
We establish the sufﬁcient conditions for implementation in rationalizable strategies by means
of a canonical mechanism. The canonical mechanism shares many basic features with the imple-
mentation mechanism suggested by Maskin and Sjöström [4] to establish complete information
implementation in the presence of mixed strategies, and is a modiﬁcation of the original mech-
anism suggested by Maskin [1]. The aforementioned allocations {zi(θ,θ )}θ,θ  appear in theAuthor's personal copy
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mechanism if agent i reports a state θ different from the reported state θ  by all the other agents.
In this case, the allocation zi(θ ,θ ) is chosen with positive probability, yet this probability can be
lowered by a suitable message of agent i and be replaced by a more favorable allocation zi(θ,θ ).
In the proposition below, we show that Maskin monotonicity together with NWA are sufﬁcient
for rationalizable implementation. The fact that we do not refer to strict Maskin monotonicity
in this statement may seem surprising given that in Proposition 1 we showed that strict Maskin
monotonicityisanecessaryconditionforrationalizableimplementation.Thisisduetothesimple
fact that under NWA, strict Maskin monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent.5
Proposition 2 (Sufﬁcient conditions). If I  3, f is responsive, satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity
and NWA, then f is implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We establish the result by constructing an implementing mechanism M = (M,g).F i r s t ,
recall that by deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity, for all θ and θ  such that f(θ) = f(θ ), there
exist i and y(θ,θ ) ∈ Y with ui(f(θ),θ)  ui(y(θ,θ ),θ) and ui(y(θ,θ ),θ )>u i(f(θ),θ ).
We deﬁne the following ﬁnite set of lotteries:
Y =
 
zi
 
θ,θ   
i,θ,θ  ∪
 
y
 
θ,θ   
{θ,θ |f(θ) =f(θ )} ∪
 
y∗
i (θ)
 
i,θ,
where the collection {zi(θ,θ )}i,θ,θ  has been deﬁned in Lemma 2 while the collection {y∗
i (θ)}i,θ
has been established in (11).
Each agent i sends a message mi = (m1
i,m2
i,m3
i,m4
i), where m1
i ∈ Θ, m2
i ∈ Z+, m3
i : Θ →
Y,m4
i ∈ Y.Thethirdcomponentofthemessageproﬁlewillallowagent i tosuggestanallocation
m3
i(θ) contingentonalltheotheragents j  = i reporting m1
j = θ.Theoutcomefunctionwillmake
use of the “uniformly worse outcome” deﬁned earlier by y. Now the outcome g(m)is determined
by the following rules:
Rule 1. If m1
i = θ and m2
i = 1 for all i,p i c kf(θ).
Rule 2. If there exists i ∈ I – called the deviating player – such that (m1
j,m2
j) = (θ,1) for all
j  = i and (m1
i,m2
i)  = (θ,1), then we go to two subrules:
(i) if ui(f(θ),θ)  ui(m3
i(θ),θ),p i c km3
i(θ) with probability 1 − 1/(m2
i + 1) and
zi(θ,θ) with probability 1/(m2
i +1);
(ii) if ui(f(θ),θ) < ui(m3
i(θ),θ),p i c kzi(θ,θ) with probability 1.
Rule 3. In all other cases, we identify a pivotal agent i by requiring that m2
i  m2
j for all j ∈ I
and that if for j  = i, m2
i = m2
j, then i<j. The rule then requires that with probability
1−1/(m2
i +1) we pick m4
i , and with probability 1/(m2
i +1) we pick y.
Claim 1. It is never a best reply for agent i to send a message with m2
i > 1( i.e., mi ∈ bθ
i (S)⇒
m2
i = 1).
5 To see this just note that if f is Maskin monotonic then f(θ) = f(θ ) implies the existence of some i and
y satisfying ui(f(θ),θ)  ui(y,θ) and ui(y,θ )>u i(f(θ),θ ). Now, under NWA, there exists yi(θ) such that
ui(f(θ),θ) > ui(yi(θ),θ). Now if one sets ˜ y = εyi(θ) + (1 − ε)y,f o rε small enough we get ui(f(θ),θ) > ui(˜ y,θ)
and ui(˜ y,θ )>u i(f(θ),θ ), showing that f is strict Maskin monotonic.Author's personal copy
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Proof of Claim 1. We proceed by contradiction and suppose that mi = (m1
i,m2
i,m3
i,m4
i) ∈
SM,θ
i and m2
i > 1. Then for any proﬁle of messages m−i that player i’s opponents may play,
(mi,m−i) will trigger either Rule 2 or Rule 3. But in this case, whatever agent i’s beliefs
λi ∈  (M−i) about the other agents’ messages, his payoff can be increased by modifying mi
appropriately, in particular by increasing the integer choice from m2
i . To see this, denote the set
of messages of all agents excluding i in which Rule 2 is triggered by
M2
−i 
 
m−i ∈ M−i
    m1
j = θ  and m2
j = 1f o rs o m eθ  for all j  = i
 
, (14)
and the set of messages of all agents excluding i in which Rule 3 is triggered as the complement
set
M3
−i  M−i\M2
−i. (15)
Suppose ﬁrst that agent i has a belief λi ∈  (M−i) under which Rule 3 is triggered with
positiveprobability,sothatλi(M3
−i)>0.Notethatifagenti playsmi, withstrictlypositiveprob-
ability y is provided. Hence, because from (11), y∗
i (θ) ∈ Y is such that ui(y∗
i (θ),θ) > ui(y,θ),
i’s expected utility conditional on Rule 3 satisﬁes
 
m−i∈M3
−i
λi(m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 
<
 
m−i∈M3
−i
λi(m−i)max
y∈Y
ui(y,θ).
Now,if i deviatesto   mi = (  m1
i,  m2
i,  m3
i,  m4
i) where   m4
i ∈ argmaxy∈Y ui(y,θ),itiseasilychecked
that i’s expected utility conditional on Rule 3 tends to
 
m−i∈M3
−i
λi(m−i)max
y∈Y
ui(y,θ)
as   m2
i tends to inﬁnity. Thus, player i can always improve his expected payoff conditional on
Rule 3 by deviating from mi to   mi and announcing   m2
i large enough.
Now suppose that agent i believes that Rule 2 will be triggered with positive probability, so
that λi(M2
−i)>0. We again consider a deviation to   mi = (  m1
i,  m2
i,  m3
i,  m4
i) and observe that the
choice of   m4
i does not affect the outcome of the mechanism conditional on Rule 2. We also note
that for any m−i ∈ M2
−i such that λi(m−i)>0, (mi,m−i) does not trigger Rule 2(ii). Indeed, if it
were the case, we would have ui(g(mi,m−i),θ) = ui(zi(m1
−i,m1
−i),θ). We have to distinguish
two cases: whether players j  = i send message θ or not. First, consider the case where m1
−i  = θ.6
Now, player i could change mi to   mi having   m3
i(m1
−i) = zi(θ,m1
−i) and keeping mi unchanged
otherwise. By Lemma 2, ui(f(m1
−i),m1
−i)>u i(zi(θ,m1
−i),m1
−i) = ui(  m3
i(m1
−i),m1
−i), and so
by construction of the mechanism, (  mi,m−i) now triggers Rule 2(i). Again using Lemma 2 and
the fact that m1
−i  = θ, we get
ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 
= ui
 
zi
 
m1
−i,m1
−i
 
,θ
 
<
 
1−1/
 
m2
i +1
  
ui
 
zi
 
θ,m1
−i
 
,θ
 
+
 
1/
 
m2
i +1
  
ui
 
zi
 
m1
−i,m1
−i
 
,θ
 
= ui
 
g(  mi,m−i),θ
 
.
Hence, the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which yields the contradiction.
Consider the second case where m1
−i = θ, player i could change mi to   mi having   mi(m1
−i) =
6 We sometimes abuse notations and write m1
−i = θ whenever m1
j = θ for all j  = i.Author's personal copy
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f(θ)and keeping mi unchanged otherwise. It is clear that by construction of the mechanism,
(  mi,m−i) now triggers Rule 2(i). Since Lemma 2 gives us
ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 
= ui
 
zi
 
m1
−i,m1
−i
 
,θ
 
<
 
1−1/
 
m2
i +1
  
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
+
 
1/
 
m2
i +1
  
ui
 
zi(θ,θ),θ
 
= ui
 
g(  mi,m−i),θ
 
,
the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which here again yields a contradiction.
So now we know that for any m−i ∈ M2
−i such that λi(m−i)>0, (mi,m−i) does not trig-
ger Rule 2(ii). Using a similar reasoning, it is easily shown that for any m−i ∈ M2
−i such that
λi(m−i)>0, we must have ui(m3
i(m1
−i),θ) > ui(zi(m1
−i,m1
−i),θ), hence the expected payoff
conditional on Rule 2 from mi:
 
m−i∈M2
−i
λi(m−i)
  
1−1/
 
m2
i +1
  
ui
 
m3
i
 
m1
−i
 
,θ
 
+
 
1/
 
m2
i +1
  
ui
 
zi
 
m1
−i,m1
−i
 
,θ
  
is strictly increasing in m2
i . It follows that the choice of   mi with   m2
i large and strictly larger than
m2
i strictly improves the expected utility of agent i if either Rule 2 or 3 is triggered, which yields
the desired contradiction. 
Claim 2. (θ,1,m3
i,m4
i) ∈ SM,θ
i for all i, θ, m3
i , m4
i .
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that player i in state θ puts probability 1 on each other agent j
sending a message of the form (θ,1,m3
j,m4
j). If player i announces a message of the form
(θ,1,m3
i,m4
i), he gets payoff ui(f(θ),θ). If he announces a message not of this form, the out-
come is determined by Rule 2. Since by Lemma 2, ui(zi(θ,θ),θ) < ui(f(θ),θ), it is clear
that by construction of the mechanism, his payoff from invoking Rule 2 is bounded above by
ui(f(θ),θ). 
Claim 3. If mi = (θ ,1,m3
i,m4
i) ∈ SM,θ
i , then θ  = θ.
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose mi = (θ ,1,m3
i,m4
i) ∈ SM,θ
i . Given the message mi, we can deﬁne
the set of messages of the remaining agents which trigger Rule 1, 2 or 3, respectively. In par-
ticular, we deﬁne M1
−i as the set of m−i ∈ M−i such that (mi,m−i) triggers Rule 1. Similarly,
M
2,i
−i is deﬁned as the set of m−i ∈ M−i such that (mi,m−i) triggers Rule 2 where player i is
the deviating player. Now consider a given belief λi of agent i.I fλi({m−i ∈ M1
−i}) = 0, then
Rule 2 or 3 will be triggered with probability one. Although, Rule 2 can now be triggered with a
“deviating player” being different of i, it is easily checked that a similar argument as in Claim 1
applies and so the message mi cannot be a best reply by agent i. Suppose now that the belief λi
of agent i is such that:
0 <λ i
  
m−i ∈ M1
−i
  
< 1. (16)
While we still argue that agent i can strictly increase his expected utility by selecting an integer
  m2
i > 1, we observe that a complication arises as with λi given by (16), a choice of   m2
i > 1 leads
from an allocation determined by Rule 1 to an allocation determined by Rule 2, and hence theAuthor's personal copy
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realization of an unfavorable allocation y with positive probability. But now we observe that by
selecting   mi such that:
  m3
i(  θ)=
 
f(θ ), if   θ = θ ,
m3
i(  θ), if otherwise,
  m4
i ∈ argmaxy∈Y ui(y,θ) and by choosing an integer   m2
i sufﬁciently large, the small loss in
Rule 2 can always be offset by a gain in Rule 3 relative to the allocation achieved under
g(mi,m−i). More formally, for mi = (θ ,1,m3
i,m4
i), since 0 <λ i({m−i ∈ M1
−i})<1 and
since – as claimed before – for all m−i ∈ M
2,i
−i such that λi(m−i)>0, ui(m3
i(m1
−i),θ) >
ui(zi(m1
−i,m1
−i),θ), i’s expected payoff from playing mi is strictly lower than
 
m−i∈M1
−i
λi(m−i)ui
 
f
 
θ  
,θ
 
+
 
m−i∈M
2,i
−i
λi(m−i)ui
 
m3
i
 
m1
−i
 
,θ
 
+
 
m−i / ∈M1
−i∪M
2,i
−i
λi(m−i)max
y∈Y
ui(y,θ)
while for   mi = (θ ,  m2
i,  m3
i,  m4
i), it is easily checked that as   m2
i tends to inﬁnity, i’s expected
payoffs tend toward the expression above. Hence, choosing   m2
i large enough,   mi is a better
response against λi for player i than mi, a contradiction.
So if mi = (θ ,1,m3
i,m4
i) ∈ SM,θ
i , it follows player i must be convinced that each other
player must be choosing a message of the form (θ ,1,m3
j,m4
j), and hence λi({m−i ∈ M1
−i}) = 1.
Thustheremustexistamessageoftheform mj = (θ ,1,m3
j,m4
j) ∈ SM,θ
j forall j.Now,proceed
by contradiction and assume that f(θ )  = f(θ). By Maskin monotonicity, we know that there
exist j with uj(f(θ ),θ )  uj(y(θ ,θ),θ ) and uj(y(θ ,θ),θ)>uj(f(θ ),θ). By the above
argument, we know that player j’s belief against which mj = (θ ,1,m3
j,m4
j) is a best reply
assigns probability one to each player l  = j sending a message of the form ml = (θ ,1,m3
l ,m4
l ).
Hence, player j’s expected payoff from playing mj is uj(f(θ ),θ), while if j deviates to   mj =
(θ ,  m2
j,  m3
j,m4
j), where   m2
j > 1 and
  m3
j(  θ)=
 
y(θ ,θ), if   θ = θ ,
m3
i(  θ), if otherwise,
player j believes with probability one that Rule 2(i) will be triggered. Hence, player j’s expected
payoff would be
 
1−1/
 
  m2
j +1
  
uj
 
y
 
θ ,θ
 
,θ
 
+
 
1/
 
  m2
j +1
  
uj
 
zj
 
θ ,θ  
,θ
 
.
Note that as   m2
j tends to inﬁnity, this expression tends to uj(y(θ ,θ),θ) which is strictly
larger than uj(f(θ ),θ). Hence for   m2
j large enough,   mj is better response for player j than
(θ ,1,m3
j,m4
j), a contradiction. Thus f(θ ) = f(θ). Since the social choice function has been
assumed to be responsive, we get θ  = θ as claimed. 
Completion of proof. Claims 1–3 together imply that for each θ : SM,θ
i  = ∅ and mi ∈
SM,θ
i ⇒ m2
i = 1 and m1
i = θ. Thus SM,θ  = ∅ and m ∈ SM,θ ⇒ g(m)= f(θ). Author's personal copy
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The mechanism M used here allows each agent to propose a menu of choices m3
i =
{m3
i(θ)}θ∈Θ. The menu m3
i gives agent i the opportunity to select an appropriate allocation in
case that Rule 2 is triggered. In our sufﬁciency argument, the NWA property replaces the no veto
property which commonly appears in the sufﬁciency argument for implementation in Nash equi-
librium. Yet, in terms of the proof, the role of the NWA property is quite distinct from the no veto
property. The NWA property guarantees that in the augmented mechanism, any report in state
θ in which an agent expresses his disagreement with the remaining agents (i.e. m2
i > 1) cannot
be a rationalizable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed that if an agent were to
express his disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would only be possible in
equilibrium if it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed f(θ).
We note that our mechanism not only implements in rationalizable messages but also imple-
ments in Nash equilibrium (the proof of Claim 2 above indeed establishes the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium at each state). In recent work, Bochet [14] and Benoit and Ok [15] report sufﬁ-
cient conditions for implementation in Nash equilibrium strategies using stochastic mechanisms.
In both contribution, the principal uses randomized allocation only out of equilibrium while pure
alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. Their conditions, the top strict difference condition
and the top coincidence condition, respectively, do not imply nor are they implied by the NWA
property required for sufﬁciency. In related work, Serrano and Vohra [16] have used stochastic
implementing mechanisms to provide weak sufﬁcient conditions for Bayesian implementation in
mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.
4. The non-responsive case
In this section, we discuss extensions of our results to the cases when the social choice func-
tion is not responsive. We will provide a strengthening of strict Maskin monotonicity that can
be shown to be sufﬁcient (together with a strengthening of the NWA) even if the social choice
function is not responsive. We also show that the strengthening of strict Maskin monotonicity
is actually necessary for rationalizable implementation given a weak condition on the class of
mechanisms to be considered. This weak condition is trivially satisﬁed when the social choice
function is responsive.
Now, given a social choice function f, let us consider the unique partition of Θ : Pf =
{Θz}z∈f(Θ)such that
Θz =
 
θ ∈ Θ
    f(θ)= z
 
. (17)
We now introduce the following notion which reduces to strict Maskin monotonicity in case f is
responsive.
Deﬁnition 5 (Strict Maskin monotonicity∗). Social choice function f satisﬁes strict Maskin
monotonicity∗ if there exists a partition P of Θ ﬁner than Pf such that for any θ:
1. θ  ∈ P(θ) whenever for all i and y
 
for all   θ ∈ P(θ): ui
 
f(θ),  θ
 
>u i(y,  θ)
 
⇒
 
ui
 
f(θ),θ  
 ui
 
y,θ   
; (18)
or, equivalently,
2. θ  / ∈ P(θ) implies for some i and y
ui
 
y,θ  
>u i
 
f(θ),θ  
and ui
 
f(θ),  θ
 
>u i(y,  θ) for all   θ ∈ P(θ). (19)Author's personal copy
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Before we establish the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, we brieﬂy describe the com-
plications that arise with a non-responsive social choice function. By deﬁnition, under a non-
responsive social choice function there are at least two states, θ and θ , that lead to the same
social choice: f(θ)= f(θ ) = z. Now, a priori, the principal would not need to know whether it
is the state θ or θ  which leads to the realization of the social choice z. In fact, it would appear
that it would be sufﬁcient to learn that the realized state belongs to the set Θz of states which
lead to the social choice z. Now, such a coarse reporting protocol as suggested by the above par-
tition Pf would be sufﬁcient if the agents were known to report truthfully, yet a problem arises if
they might not report truthfully. For, if an agent now alleges collusive behavior of the remaining
agents, the principal may lack the information to verify whether the whistle-blower himself is
behaving in an incentive compatible manner. After all, the principal would merely know that the
reported state is in some set Θz but would not know the identity of the state itself. Thus, while
it might not be useful to distinguish between any two states θ,θ  ∈ Θz if the agents were to re-
port truthfully, it might be critical to distinguish between θ and θ  in order to fend off undesirable
equilibrium play by the agents. This discussion might therefore suggest that the inequalities (18),
or alternatively (19), should be satisﬁed for the ﬁnest possible partition of states. But, as we argue
next, such a condition would (i) require too much to constitute a necessary condition, and (ii)
be impossible to satisfy by any implementing mechanism.
Theﬁrst observationisstraightforwardto establish.Considerforthemomentthestrict Maskin
monotonicity∗ condition in the version of (19), which we might refer to as the whistle-blower
inequality. Now suppose that the social choice problem is such that the inequalities (19) are
satisﬁed even for the coarse partition Pf itself. In this case, we would ﬁnd that the principal
would not need to distinguish between any two states θ,θ  ∈ Θz, either for truthtelling or, by
condition (19), for whistle-blowing behavior.
The second observation stems from an earlier result. Lemma 1 gave a sufﬁcient condition
under which the set of rationalizable actions for any pair of states, θ and θ , have to be identical
for all agents. For the purpose here we can restrict attention to any two states with θ,θ  ∈ Θz.
In this case, the condition (1) reads as follows:
ui(z,θ) > ui(y,θ) ⇒ ui
 
z,θ  
 ui
 
y,θ  
for all i and y.
In words, if for every agent i, the upper contour set (relative to the allocation f(θ)= f(θ ) = z),
at one state, say θ , is included in the upper contour set of the other state, say θ, then the sets
of rationalizable actions have to coincide. But of course, once the sets of rationalizable actions
have to agree, it will be impossible to distinguish behavior in state θ from behavior in state θ .
The inclusion property of the upper contour sets, given by condition (1), thus imposes an upper
bound on how ﬁne the partition P can be chosen while remaining compatible with rationalizable
behavior. We ﬁnally observe that the partition P may yet have to be coarser than is indicated by
the pairwise inclusion property. To see this, consider θ,θ ,θ   ∈ Θz, and suppose that the upper
contour sets (relative to the allocation z) in state θ  as well as in state θ   are included in the
upper contour sets in state θ, but that the upper contour sets in the state θ  and θ   themselves
do not display an inclusive relationship. Now, Lemma 1 tells us that SM,θ = SM,θ 
and that
SM,θ = SM,θ  
which of course implies that SM,θ 
= SM,θ  
even though the condition (1) does
not apply to the states θ  and θ   themselves.
As we already stated, we can prove that strict Maskin monotonicity∗ is necessary under a
weak condition on the class of mechanisms we consider. This condition states that for any state
θ and any rationalizable message mi of any player i in this state, the message mi is also best-Author's personal copy
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response to some belief with support in the set of rationalizable actions of the other players and
for any state   θ such that SM,  θ = SM,θ, best responses against this belief are non-empty.
Deﬁnition6(Thebest-responseproperty).Givenasocialchoicefunction f,amechanism M has
the best-response property if for all θ and all mi ∈ SM,θ
i , there exists λ
mi,θ
i ∈  (M−i) satisfying
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM,θ
j for each j  = i, and such that mi is a best response against λ
mi,θ
i
in state θ and
argmax
m 
i
 
m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,  θ
 
 = ∅
for all   θ such that SM,  θ = SM,θ.
Note that if f is responsive then any implementing mechanism must satisfy SM,  θ = SM,θ ⇒
  θ = θ and so any implementing mechanism must have the best-response property. Moreover,
the best-response property also holds for any pair θ,θ  which are directly related through the
inclusion property (1). The best-response property then secures that it applies also to proﬁles
which are indirectly related as in the example of θ,θ ,θ   ∈ Θz discussed above. Hence, the
subsequent Proposition 3 generalizes Proposition 1 above.
Proposition 3 (Necessary conditions). If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a
mechanism M having the best-response property, then f satisﬁes strict Maskin monotonicity∗.
In order to show this, we prove the following lemma that generalizes Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. Assume the existence of a mechanism M = ((Mi)I
i=1,g), that has the best-response
property and that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Pick θ and θ  satisfying condi-
tion (18) where the partition P is assumed to be P(θ  ) ={˜ θ ∈ Θ | SM,θ  
= SM,˜ θ} for any θ  .
We have SM,θ = SM,θ 
.
Proof. Fix any mechanism M = ((Mi)I
i=1,g)that has the best-response property and that im-
plements f and pick θ and θ  satisfying condition (18) for P(θ  ) ={˜ θ ∈ Θ | SM,θ  
= SM,˜ θ}
i.e. for all i and y
 
for all   θ ∈ P(θ): ui
 
f(θ),  θ
 
>u i(y,  θ)
 
⇒
 
ui
 
f(θ),θ  
 ui
 
y,θ   
.
Note that by construction,   θ ∈ P(θ) ⇒ SM,  θ = SM,θ. In addition, since M implements f in
rationalizable strategies, for any state in P(θ  ), f picks the outcome f(θ  ) and so P is ﬁner
than Pf.
We ﬁrst show that SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
. Because bθ(SM,θ) = SM,θ, SM,θ has the best-response
property in state θ i.e. for all player i and all mi ∈ SM,θ
i , there exists λ
mi,θ
i ∈  (M−i) such that
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0 ⇒ mj ∈ SM,θ
j for each j  = i, and
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ
 

 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ
 
for all m 
i ∈ Mi. In addition, since M has the best-response property, λ
mi,θ
i can be chosen so that:Author's personal copy
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argmax
m 
i
 
m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,  θ
 
 = ∅,
for all   θ ∈ P(θ). This in turn implies that for all   θ ∈ P(θ):
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),  θ
 

 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,  θ
 
(20)
for all m 
i ∈ Mi. To see this, observe that if it were not true, we would have for some   θ ∈ P(θ):
 
m−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m∗
i ,m−i
 
,  θ
 
>
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),  θ
 
= ui
 
f(θ),  θ
 
where m∗
i denotes a best response to λ
mi,θ
i in state   θ and so g(m∗
i ,m−i)  = f(θ) for some
(m∗
i ,m−i) ∈ SM,  θ which contradicts the fact that M = ((Mi)I
i=1,g)implements f.
Now,wewant toshow that mi isalso abest response against λ
mi,θ
i in state θ . Since i and mi ∈
SM,θ
i have been ﬁxed arbitrarily, this will prove that SM,θ has the best-response property in state
θ  and so that SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
as claimed. Note ﬁrst that for any m−i such that λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)>0,
m−i ∈ SM,θ
−i and so because mi ∈ SM,θ
i ,w eh a v eg(mi,m−i) = f(θ). Thus,
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ  
= ui
 
f(θ),θ  
=
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ  
(21)
for all m 
i ∈ SM,θ
i . In addition, we claim that for all   θ ∈ P(θ):
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),  θ
 
= ui
 
f(θ),  θ
 
>
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,  θ
 
(22)
for any m 
i / ∈ SM,θ
i . Indeed, by (20), the above is true with a weak inequality. Now if an equality
were to hold, some m 
i / ∈ SM,θ
i would be a best response against λ
mi,θ
i in some state   θ. Thus the
set ({m 
i}∪SM,  θ
i ) × SM,  θ
−i = ({m 
i}∪SM,θ
i ) × SM,θ
−i would have the best-response property in
state   θ implying that m 
i ∈ SM,  θ
i = SM,θ
i which is false by assumption.
Now, by assumption, we know that
 
  θ ∈ P(θ) : ui
 
f(θ),  θ
 
>u i(y,  θ)
 
⇒
 
ui
 
f(θ),θ  
 ui
 
y,θ   
for all i and y
and so applying this to the lotteries y 
 
m−i λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)g(m 
i,m−i), Eq. (22) yields
 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g(mi,m−i),θ  
= ui
 
f(θ),θ  

 
m−i∈M−i
λ
mi,θ
i (m−i)ui
 
g
 
m 
i,m−i
 
,θ  
(23)Author's personal copy
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for any m 
i / ∈ SM,θ
i . Finally, (21) and (23) ensure that mi is also a best response against λ
mi,θ
i in
state θ . Hence, SM,θ ⊆ SM,θ 
as claimed.
To complete the proof, we have to show that SM,θ ⊇ SM,θ 
. The argument is the same as in
Lemma 1. 
Note that if f is implementable by a mechanism M that has the best-response property, then
if one were to pick the partition P given by P(θ  ) ={˜ θ ∈ Θ | SM,θ  
= SM,˜ θ} for any θ  , then
whenever θ and θ  satisfy condition (18), by Lemma 3, we must have SM,θ = SM,θ 
and so, by
deﬁnition, θ  ∈ P(θ). Hence, Proposition 3 is obtained as a corollary of Lemma 3.
As mentioned earlier, it is easily checked that our sufﬁciency argument can be extended to
this setting provided that a strengthening of NWA is used. To be more speciﬁc, if one assumes
that f is (strict) Maskin monotonic and that for any state θ, there exists some outcome that is
worse than the outcome selected by f at any state in the partition cell P(θ), then we can build a
mechanism similar to the one built in the proof of Proposition 2.7 In the revised mechanism each
player is asked to report a partition cell P in P, an integer, a mapping from P to Y a n dal o t t e r y
in Y. Essentially, everything would go as if we were replacing each state θ by the partition cell
containing θ. In particular, as in the responsive case, we can show that for any rationalizable
message, using condition (19) in the deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity∗, each agent will report
truthfully, i.e., will report P(θ) whenever the true state is θ and announce an integer equal to 1.
ThemodiﬁednotionsofstrictMaskinmonotonicityandNWAaswellasthesufﬁciencyargument
itself are presented in detail in the working paper version (see [17]). The sufﬁciency theorem is
stated and established as Proposition 4 of the working paper.
5. Concluding remarks
Ordinal and cardinal preferences. The canonical approach (e.g. Maskin [1]) of implementa-
tion with complete information associates to each state a proﬁle of ordinal preferences and does
not introduce any cardinal representation. The main reason for this is the use of (pure) Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept. For this solution concept, there is no need to specify cardi-
nal representations. However, once we change the solution concept to rationalizability, we need
to specify proﬁles of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions. As already mentioned, we
adopted a cardinal approach i.e. we associate to each state a single cardinal representation. An-
other way to proceed would be to maintain an ordinal approach by associating to each state
ordinal preferences and require rationalizable implementation to be achieved irrespective of the
cardinal representation used at this state. This is for instance the approach followed in Mezzetti
and Renou [18]. Let us now be more formal and identify a state θ with a proﬁle of ordinal pref-
erences (θ
i )i over Z. We say that u = (ui(·,θ))i,θ is a (cardinal) representation of (θ
i )i,θ if
[ui(z,θ)  ui(z ,θ)⇔ z θ
i z ] for each player i and state θ. In the sequel, we write maxθ
i Z
for {z ∈ Z | z θ
i z  for all z  ∈ Z},i nt h es a m ew a ym i n θ
i Z stands for {z ∈ Z | z  θ
i z for all
z  ∈ Z}. We then say that a social choice function f is implementable in rationalizable strate-
gies independently of the cardinal representation if there exists a mechanism M such that, for
any cardinal representation u of (θ
i )i,θ, for all θ, SM,θ  = ∅ and m ∈ SM,θ ⇒ g(m)= f(θ).
In the cardinal case, we know by Proposition 1 that going from the solution concept of Nash
7 As for Proposition 2, the proof would go through if we just considered Maskin monotonicity∗ instead of strict Maskin
monotonicity∗.Author's personal copy
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equilibrium to rationalizability implies that the usual necessary condition (Maskin monotonic-
ity) is strengthened to its strict version. The following result is then a straightforward corollary
of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 (Necessary condition for all cardinal representations). If f is implementable in ra-
tionalizable strategies independently of the cardinal representation, then f satisﬁes strict Maskin
monotonicity for any cardinal representation.
We now present a monotonicity notion in the ordinal preference setting, namely strict set
monotonicity.
Deﬁnition 7 (Strict set monotonicity). A social choice function f : Θ → Z satisﬁes strict set
monotonicity if f(θ)= f(θ ) whenever for all i, either f(θ)∈ minθ
i Z or f(θ)∈ maxθ 
i Z or the
following two conditions are satisﬁed:
f(θ) θ
i z ⇒ f(θ) θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z,
and
f(θ)θ
i z ⇒ f(θ)θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z.
The next result establishes that strict Maskin monotonicity for any cardinal representation
has a close analogue when we consider the ordinal setting, namely strict set monotonicity. The
central condition of our characterization can hence be mapped into the purely ordinal setting in
a natural way.
Proposition 4 (Strict Maskin and strict set monotonicity). Assume Z is ﬁnite. A social choice
function f : Θ → Z satisﬁes strict Maskin monotonicity for any cardinal representation if and
only if it is strict set monotone.
Proof. Assume f is strict Maskin monotone for any cardinal representation. Pick θ and θ  s.t.
for all i : f(θ)∈ minθ
i Z or f(θ)∈ maxθ 
i Z or the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
f(θ) θ
i z ⇒ f(θ) θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z, (24)
and
f(θ)θ
i z ⇒ f(θ)θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z. (25)
We have to show that f(θ)= f(θ ). In order to prove this, we will show that there is a cardinal
representation u = (ui(·, ˜ θ))i,˜ θ of (
˜ θ
i )i,˜ θ s.t.
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>
 
z∈Z
y(z)ui(z,θ)
⇒ ui
 
f(θ),θ  

 
z∈Z
y(z)ui
 
z,θ  
for all i and y ∈ Y.
Pick an arbitrary player i. In the case of f(θ)∈ minθ
i Z or f(θ)∈ maxθ 
i Z, it isclearthat any rep-
resentation satisﬁes the implication. Now, consider the case where the conditions (24) and (25)Author's personal copy
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both hold. By the proof of Theorem 1 in Mezzetti and Renou [18], there exists a cardinal repre-
sentation such that ui(f(θ),θ) = ui(f(θ),θ ) and ui(z,θ)  ui(z,θ ) for all z ∈ Z. The proof
then follows directly.
Suppose that f is strict set monotonic. Pick θ and θ  and a cardinal representation u =
(ui(·, ˜ θ))i,˜ θ of (
˜ θ
i )i,˜ θ such that
ui
 
f(θ),θ
 
>
 
z∈Z
y(z)ui(z,θ) ⇒ ui
 
f(θ),θ  

 
z∈Z
y(z)ui
 
z,θ  
. (26)
We have to show that f(θ)= f(θ ). Now, pick an arbitrary player i.I ff(θ)∈ minθ
i Z or f(θ)∈
maxθ 
i Z, strict set monotonicity of f completes the proof. So assume that f(θ) / ∈ minθ
i Z or
f(θ)/ ∈ maxθ 
i Z. We show that (i) f(θ)θ
i z ⇒ f(θ)θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z and (ii) f(θ) θ
i z ⇒
f(θ) θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z. Note ﬁrst that condition (26) clearly implies that f(θ) θ
i z ⇒ f(θ)θ 
i
z for all z ∈ Z. If (i) were not true, there would exist z ∼θ
i f(θ)and z  θ 
i f(θ). Choose z ∈
minθ
i Z and consider the lottery (1−ε)z+εz. For any ε>0, this lottery is strictly dominated by
f(θ)at θ since f(θ)/ ∈ minθ
i Z. However, at θ ,f o rε>0 small enough, (1−ε)z+εz is strictly
preferred to f(θ) at θ , this contradicts (26). So, (i) must be true. Secondly, if (ii) were not
true, there would exist f(θ) θ
i z and z ∼θ 
i f(θ). Choose z ∈ maxθ 
i Z and consider the lottery
(1 − ε)z+ εz. Clearly, for any ε>0, the lottery (1 − ε)z+ εz is strictly preferred to f(θ)at θ 
since f(θ)/ ∈ maxθ 
i Z. But now for ε>0 small enough, f(θ)is strictly preferred to (1−ε)z+εz
at state θ, this contradicts (26). So, (ii) must be true. 
We note that the necessary (and sufﬁcient under additional no-veto requirements) condition
for implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium by Mezzetti and Renou [18] is strictly weaker
than our necessary condition.8
Social choice sets and social choice correspondences. So far, we restricted our attention to
the analysis to social choice functions. We now discuss extension of the results to social choice
correspondences and social choice sets. A social choice correspondence deﬁnes a set of permis-
sible allocations and rationalizability is a set-based solution concept. Thus, there are a number
of plausible extensions of the deﬁnition of rationalizable implementation to social choice cor-
respondences. The extensions basically vary to the extent that one wishes to restrict attention
to selections in the set of outcome proﬁles. We ﬁrst note that the concept of social choice cor-
respondence prevalent in the complete information literature (see Maskin [1]) differs from the
8 The central concept in Mezzetti and Renou [18] is the notion of weak set monotonicity. A social choice function f
is weak set monotonic if f(θ)= f(θ ) whenever for all i: either f(θ)∈ maxθ 
i X or the following two conditions are
satisﬁed:
f(θ) θ
i z ⇒ f(θ) θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z,
and
f(θ)θ
i z ⇒ f(θ)θ 
i z for all z ∈ Z.
It can be shown, along the lines of the proof of Proposition 4, that weak set monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin
monotonicity for any cardinal representation. We are grateful to Ludovic Renou for discussions clarifying the relation
between these monotonicity conditions.Author's personal copy
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Table 1
u(·,·)a b c d
α 1+ε,00 ,1+ε 1,11 +2ε,1+2ε
β 1+ε,00 ,ε 1,11 +2ε,1+2ε
concept of a social choice set, prevalent in the incomplete information literature (see Palfrey and
Srivastava [19] and Jackson [20]). Our results for social choice functions extend immediately to
social choice sets. Indeed, say that a social choice set F ={ f|f: Θ → Y} is implementable if
and only if for each element f of F, there is a mechanism that implements f.9 Then the above
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for social choice functions can be directly applied to provide
necessary as well as sufﬁcient conditions for the implementation of a social choice set.
In contrast, the analysis would change substantially if we sought to obtain necessary or sufﬁ-
cient conditions for rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences. To illustrate
this point, we now show that Maskin monotonicity may not even be a necessary condition for
implementation in rationalizable strategies (according to at least one natural deﬁnition of these
terms).10 Wedescribethedifﬁcultyofsocialchoicecorrespondenceswiththefollowingapproach
(and subsequent example). A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a mapping F : Θ → 2Y/∅.
A social choice correspondence F is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists a
mechanism M with g[SM,θ]=F(θ)for all θ ∈ Θ.AS C CF is Maskin monotonic if: whenever
y∗ ∈ F(θ) and ui(y∗,θ) ui(y,θ) ⇒ ui(y∗,θ )  ui(y,θ ) for all i and y; then y∗ ∈ F(θ ).
Now consider the following example. There are 2 agents; Θ ={ α,β}; Z ={ a,b,c,d}; payoffs
are given by Table 1.
The social choice correspondence is F∗(α) ={ a,b,c,d} and F∗(β) ={ d}. Now we demon-
strate that F∗ is not Maskin monotonic. To see why, pick a ∈ F∗(α). Observe that player 1’s
preferences are state independent and so u1(a,α)  u1(y,α) ⇒ u1(a,β)  u1(y,β). In addi-
tion, a is the (unique) worst outcome for player 2 at state θ and so if u2(a,α)  u2(y,α) then
y = a and so we must trivially have u2(a,β)  u2(y,β). Thus, Maskin monotonicity would re-
quire a ∈ F∗(β) which is false. But nonetheless F∗ is implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Consider the following mechanism M with Mi ={ m1
i,m2
i,m3
i} and deterministic g given by the
following matrix:
g(·) m1
2 m2
2 m3
2
m1
1 a b c
m2
1 b a c
m3
1 c c d
.
Now, for each i, SM,α
i,k = Mi for all k and thus SM,α
i = Mi. Thus g[SM,α]={ a,b,c,d}=
F∗(α). But in state β, we have in subsequent rounds of elimination:
9 Thisnotion of implementation of thesocial choicesetpermits theimplementing mechanism to depend on thefunction
selected from the social choice set, this is slightly different from the one given in Palfrey and Srivastava [19] and Jackson
[20].
10 As shown in Mezzetti and Renou [18], a similar issue arises when one considers implementation in mixed Nash
equilibrium where – contrary to the usual requirement – implementation does not ask for each alternative in the set of
desired alternatives to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium.Author's personal copy
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Table 2
u(·,·) abcd
α 0,0,00 ,1,01 ,0,00 ,0,1
β 0,0,01 ,1,10 ,0,00 ,0,0
S
M,β
1,0 =
 
m1
1,m2
1,m3
1
 
and S
M,β
2,0 =
 
m1
2,m2
2,m3
2
 
,
S
M,β
1,1 =
 
m1
1,m2
1,m3
1
 
and S
M,β
2,1 =
 
m3
2
 
,
S
M,β
1,2 =
 
m3
1
 
and S
M,β
2,2 =
 
m3
2
 
,
and thus g[SM,β]={ d}=F∗(β). We thus showed that F∗ is implementable in rationalizable
strategies, yet did not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. The example, in particular the failure of
Maskin monotonicity to remain a necessary condition, suggests that novel, but currently uniden-
tiﬁed, necessary conditions would arise with social choice correspondences. On the other hand,
the ordinal versions of the necessary conditions for social choice functions, described in Corol-
lary 1 and Proposition 4 suggest that the insights in Mezzetti and Renou [18] might be extended
to social choice correspondences. In particular, Mezzetti and Renou [18] obtain necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for mixed strategy Nash implementation of correspondence using the ordi-
nal approach. It is a natural but open conjecture that strict versions of their conditions would be
appropriate for rationalizable implementation.
Strict Maskin monotonicity. We identiﬁed a necessary condition for rationalizable implemen-
tation, strict Maskin monotonicity, that is strictly stronger than the usual one for Nash imple-
mentation. Here we provide an example of a social choice function that is not rationalizable
implementable but which is Nash implementable. There are 3 agents; the states are given by
Θ ={ α,β}; and the deterministic allocations are Z ={ a,b,c,d}; the resulting payoffs are given
by Table 2.
The social choice correspondence is f(α)= a and f(β)= b. It is easily checked that f is
Maskinmonotonic(u1(f(α),α) = u1(b,α) but u1(f(α),β)<u1(b,β);similarly,u1(f(β),β)>
u1(c,β) but u1(f(β),β) < u1(c,β)) and satisﬁes no-veto-power. Hence, standard arguments
(see Maskin [1] and Maskin and Sjöström [4]) show that f is implementable in (pure or mixed)
Nash equilibrium. However, for any player i and y ∈  (Z): ui(f(α),α)  ui(y,α) and so this
social choice function cannot be strict Maskin monotonic, and so it is not implementable in
rationalizable strategies.
Finally, from a purely game-theoretic point of view, the results presented in Propositions 1
and 2 may appear surprisingly strong. Given that we are investigating a social choice function,
the notion of full implementation is akin to requiring that the game has a unique equilibrium
(outcome). The present implementation results then say that necessary conditions to get a unique
rationalizable outcome are similar to those required for a unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
In addition, provided that the social choice function is responsive, under mild additional con-
ditions, a unique rationalizable outcome arises under the same condition as a unique Nash
equilibrium outcome. This is noteworthy as the necessary and almost sufﬁcient condition of
Maskin monotonicity is much weaker than the well-known conditions under which there are
close connections between Nash equilibrium and rationalizability, such as supermodular or con-
cave games. The Nash equilibrium results indicate the strength of the implementation approach
to reduce the number of equilibria. The arguments presented here complement and extend theseAuthor's personal copy
1274 D. Bergemann et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 1253–1274
results. By using inﬁnite message spaces and stochastic allocations, we strengthen the positive
implementation results to the weaker solution concept of rationalizability.
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